UK boots on the ground in Ukraine to train troops a risky solution to undefined problem
Defence and security blogger @PinstripedLine weighs up the arguments for and against the UK sending troops to train soldiers in Ukraine.
Should British forces be deployed in Ukraine to train the Ukrainian armed forces? This is an idea that has gained traction recently, for example with French President Emmanuel Macron suggesting in March that 'nothing should be off the table' when it comes to Nato support for Ukraine.
Similarly, the former Armed Forces Minister James Heappey states that the UK should consider deploying troops into the country.
As the war enters its third year, should Nato support step up by putting British 'boots on the ground' or is this a risky step too far?
Prior to the invasion in February 2022, the UK maintained training teams in Ukraine, known as Op Orbital. Established in 2015, it trained more than 20,000 Ukrainian troops until the Russian invasion, when training was moved to the UK and renamed Op Interflex.
Since then, more than 34,000 troops have been trained by British and other Nato/allied instructors.
Although no training team is in Ukraine, the spokesman for Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has confirmed that there are a small number of personnel in the country helping support Ukrainian armed forces and it’s previously been confirmed there is military protection at the British embassy.
Naturally these deployments are highly classified with no public information on them.
Given the suggestions that the UK should now look to put troops on the ground in a different capacity, it is worth asking what the potential risks are of this, and whether it would be an escalation too far for Russia?
The first risk is that British (or Nato) troops in Ukraine could find themselves targets of Russian attack – either inadvertently or intentionally.
For example, if British troops were stationed at a Ukrainian training camp that came under missile attack there would be no way to distinguish them as non-combatants and they would be at equal risk of injury or death.
Given that Russia makes little if any distinction in targeting sites between combatants and civilians, it is even less likely that they'd avoid striking sites with Nato advisers present.
The risk would be high that UK troops could find themselves participants, sucked into the conflict and potentially killed or injured because of wider strikes.
Another issue for troops deployed is what Rules of Engagement (ROE) would they use? ROE are critical in setting out the legal framework for how military personnel can use force on operations.
The challenge in Ukraine is that British troops would need to be armed, they would need to be able to legally defend themselves and the risk of being deployed in a fast-moving war zone where the potential for conflict is high, is that they find themselves engaged in direct inadvertent contact with Russian troops and have to exercise their right to self-defence if they come under attack.
Such a move could rapidly escalate if it became clear that British and Russian troops were engaged in gun battles somewhere in Ukraine.
This is not an unwarranted concern. In 1999, when British troops were deploying into Kosovo, there was a standoff that nearly escalated in Pristina airport when British and Russian troops were facing off against each other as both nations scrambled to deploy troops into the country.
There were fears at the time that a miscalculation or incident could quickly lead to war.
The risk in Ukraine is similar – troops engaged in self-defence could see a rapid escalation of tensions that would be hard to calm down again.
Force protection and logistics would be a practical challenge as well.
To date, British and Nato support to Ukraine has involved using air bridges in Eastern Europe, flying in munitions and supplies that are then moved by land across the border.
If you put UK troops on the ground there will be a need to shorten that supply chain to ensure that food, fuel and medical support is available.
It would be politically challenging to deploy troops who don't have full support available, but doing so would mean establishing both a permanent military base and appropriate force protection inside Ukraine.
This raises the problem of escalation – these sites' locations would be known to Russian intelligence and could well be targeted for attack.
It is unlikely that Russia would see any distinction between British and Ukrainian facilities, and would regard the site as a legitimate target for action.
The challenge of being deployed in this manner is that it blurs the lines between helping and offering support to a friendly nation at a distance and being drawn into a conflict on the ground as an active bystander.
It is important to remember that proxy conflict between Russia and the West is not a new development.
While the Cold War is often thought of as a war that never happened, there were a surprising number of incidents involving attacks on Nato forces by Soviet forces.
For example, the US Department of Defense has records of more than 40 aircraft being shot down by Soviet air defence forces between 1945 and 1977 – including in 1961 a US Air Force RB47 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Soviet fighters while collecting intelligence in international airspace, killing four crew.
During both Korea and Vietnam, a proxy war was fought between the Soviet Union and the USA, with significant Russian materiel support (guns, missiles, logistics and aircraft) being provided to their allies as well as advisers on the ground.
It is now known that many Russian pilots flew combat sorties against UN forces in Korea, pretending to be Chinese pilots.
In Vietnam, Soviet intelligence 'trawlers' stationed off the coast of US Air Force bomber bases transmitted warnings of incoming air attacks, while Soviet 'advisers' operated SAM systems and are credited with shooting down 48 US jets in 1965-66 when they were deployed to help augment North Vietnamese air defences – at least 12 Soviet troops were killed in Vietnam.
In all these instances though the situation did not escalate out of control.
The combination of both sides wanting to avoid direct overt conflict, and the fact the information was tightly controlled meant the public remained unaware that Russian and Americans were in direct conflict with each other in a proxy war.
More widely, for many decades an undeclared proxy war occurred between Nato and Soviet navies as Western submarines sneaked covertly into Russian territorial waters to gather vital intelligence, resulting in the use of depth charges and explosives to force them to the surface.
These incidents, although mostly still classified, hint at the extremely high-risk world of covert operations. Even today, proxy wars continue, with the Kremlin making significant use of 'mercenaries' such as the Wagner Group to support pro-Russian regimes in Africa.
Given this, is it possible that the risks of conflict between the West and Russia are overblown if Western troops were to deploy to deliver training in Ukraine?
It is very difficult to predict – unlike the Cold War where incidents could be hushed up, and social media did not exist, today the electronic information battle being fought would mean the world would quickly know of any clash, and the space/time for cooler heads to prevail is far more limited.
Politically any deployment would be high risk and potentially unpopular with the public.
While there is strong public sympathy more widely for Ukraine, and providing weapons, support and training from a distance, it is unlikely that the British public would want to see troops deployed on the ground.
What it comes down to is the risk/reward calculation about how supporting the Ukrainians on the ground in their own country would help increase the likelihood of their eventual victory.
If it was felt by politicians and policymakers that active support in country for training would significantly increase this, and that the risks of confrontation with Russia could be managed or mitigated, then some may see this as worth doing.
The challenge if troops were injured or killed as a result of wider Russian operations is significant, and it will be hard to work out how to respond effectively.
There is unlikely to be international support for more sanctions against Russia, and given the scale of military assistance already offered by Nato there are relatively few military ways left to respond short of providing more weapons and assistance.
Short of escalation and direct conflict with Russia, it is hard to see how the UK or other Nato countries could effectively respond if the conflict got out of hand – meaning British troops would be committed to operating in a conflict zone, at risk of attack from Russian forces, but with no means of responding effectively if attacked.
Ultimately the question that needs answering before committing to this is how would putting British or Nato troops on the ground in Ukraine deliver victory more effectively than what is currently being done in Europe?
Unless the benefits clearly outweigh the risks, it seems, at present, a high-risk solution to solve a problem that hasn't really been defined.
Would the public support this high-risk strategy relative to the potential gains it offers at present?
The challenge for both politicians and policymakers is to work out whether they want to take these risks, the gains they offer and whether the public will support it or not.
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