Israel’s diversionary attack on Iran has set off a new security crisis in West Asia

The exchange of drone and missile attacks between Israel and Iran over three weeks in April has taken West Asia to new levels of insecurity, while changing the regional strategic scenario to Israel’s disadvantage.

The recent confrontations began on April 1 when Israeli aircraft attacked the building housing the Consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus and killed the Iranian Al Quds Force commander in Syria and Lebanon, General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, along with another general and five other officials, all of them senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This was the most serious attack on the IRGC since the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani by American missiles in January 2020. Zahedi was a high-profile Iranian military leader, having earlier held senior positions in the country’s armed forces and intelligence. Zahedi’s killing followed the Israeli assassination in Damascus of IRGC General Syed Raza Mousavi last December, and that of Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut in January.

The Israel-Iran military exchanges

Israel claimed that the embassy premises were a legitimate target since they were being used to plan attacks on Israeli and US assets. Israeli spokespersons ignored the fact that almost all embassies globally, including the US and Israeli embassies, have military and intelligence officials who, in their respective embassies, plan attacks on their countries’ enemies in the host or neighbouring countries. However, most Western countries failed to condemn the attack.

A billboard with a picture of members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps killed in the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy complex is seen in the Syrian capital of Damascus on April 5, 2024. | Photo Credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/ VIA REUTERS

Since Iran in the past has generally avoided hitting Israeli targets directly after attacks on its assets in Iran and in the neighbourhood, the expectation in Israel was that Iran would not go beyond hostile rhetoric. In the event, the Iranian response was both measured and spectacular.

On April 13, Iran directed over 300 weapons at Israel, which included 185 drones, 38 cruise missiles, and 10 ballistic missiles. Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen also directed drones and missiles at Israel. Israel claimed that 99 per cent of the drones and missiles were intercepted by its aircraft and prevented from causing damage on its territory by its air defence system. Israel was supported in these interceptions by the US, the UK, France, and even Jordan, which, apparently, intercepted drones in its “sovereign space”. Israeli and US sources also said that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had participated in the interceptions in support of Israel, but these reports were firmly rejected as misinformation.

The unprecedented Iranian attacks placed Israel in a dilemma: fearing further escalation, US President Joe Biden advised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “take the win”. But Netanyahu, under considerable pressure from his extreme right-wing coalition partners, asserted that Israel would take action in its own interest. The extremist Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, called for a “crushing attack” on Iran.

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Israel’s response came five days later, on April 19: it directed just three drones at the central Iranian city of Isfahan which were swiftly intercepted by Iran and caused no damage. A few hours later, Israel also hit Syrian military facilities in the southern province of Deraa and caused some “material damage”. Iran dismissed the attacks on its territory as an infiltration, without even mentioning that it was an Israeli attack.

Looking back, it would seem that the three aerial exchanges between the regional foes were chess moves on the regional stage, each move heavy with symbolism. As of now, this round appears to have ended in a draw, with both sides deciding not to escalate the situation further.

Run-up to the attack on the Iranian embassy

The Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy was instigated by events in March.  Netanyahu was under increasing domestic pressure as the Gaza war seemed to have reached a stalemate. Popular disgruntlement with government policies was reflected in anti-government demonstrations calling for the release of hostages and fresh elections in different Israeli cities. However, Netanyahu focussed on continuing the conflict, making no effort to negotiate a ceasefire and obtain the exchange of Israeli hostages with the release of Palestinian prisoners. A commentator, Nahum Barnea, wrote in the Israeli daily, Yedioth Ahronoth: “The muddling in hostage negotiations parallels the muddling in Gaza, the muddling in Lebanon and the muddling in Washington.” The last reference was to the steady month-long estrangement between the US and Israel, with the former, Israel’s staunchest ally, publicly expressing dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza.

On March 3, US Vice President Kamala Harris called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and criticised Israel for inadequate aid deliveries into the beleaguered enclave. These were the first public criticisms of Israel at this high level, and were the US administration’s response to increasing domestic dissatisfaction with Biden’s total support for Israel. Soon, there were reports in the US of a Biden-Netanyahu “rift”, with some Democratic senators even calling for curtailing arms supplies to Israel if humanitarian aid to Gaza was not increased. The Biden administration also conveyed to Israel that its planned attack on Rafah, where nearly two million displaced people of Gaza had taken refuge, would amount to crossing a “red line”.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer launched a personal attack on Netanyahu, saying his continuation as prime minister was a “liability” for Israel. To crown this US-Israel divide, the UN Security Council on March 25 adopted a Security Council Resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. The expected US veto never happened.  

The Biden-Netanyahu divide was exacerbated on April 1 when Israeli soldiers killed seven aid workers with the global charity organisation World Central Kitchen. Some of those killed were from Australia, Britain, Canada, and Poland, all US allies. Biden declared himself “outraged and heartbroken”.

Thus, Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy was a calculated escalation to divert US attention from Gaza to Iran. Netanyahu calculated that either Iran would not retaliate immediately, or, even if it did and confrontation escalated, the US would rush to Israel’s assistance.

In this file photo, US President Joe Biden attends a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during Biden’s visit to Tel Aviv, Israel, in October 2023. | Photo Credit: Evelyn Hockstein/ REUTERS

Netanyahu’s gambit was remarkably successful: now, instead of castigating the Israeli Prime Minister for dragging West Asia towards a regional conflict, Biden announced on April 14 on X that his country’s “commitment to Israel’s security against threats from Iran and its proxies is ironclad”. To demonstrate this “iron-clad” support, the head of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), General Erik Kurilla, rushed to Israel to coordinate with Israel the response to Iran’s expected retaliation. There was no reference now to the killing of aid workers or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Iran’s attack and Israel’s counter-response

Iran’s robust response to the attack on its embassy, called “Operation True Promise”, seems to have surprised both Israel and the US. There are reports that Iran gave an advance warning to its neighbours and possibly even to the US about the impending attack. Most of the drones were slow-moving, taking several hours to reach Israel, and could be easily intercepted and destroyed, enabling Israel to claim a spectacular “victory” by downing 99 per cent of the attacking vehicles directed at its territory.

The important point to note is that some missiles did penetrate Israel’s “Iron Dome” defence system and hit certain specific targets—the Nevatim and Ramon airbases from where Israeli aircraft had taken off to attack the Iranian embassy, and, possibly, Israel’s intelligence base in the Golan Heights. An IRGC commander said that Iran could have launched a much larger attack, “but we restricted it to only target facilities that the [Israeli] regime had used to attack the [Iranian] consulate”.

But the attacks still have considerable strategic significance. They were Iran’s first direct attacks on Israel from its territory. Iran also demonstrated that its weapons could penetrate Israel’s air defences and hit pre-planned targets. Iranian sources have confirmed that their most sophisticated weaponry—the hypersonic missiles that move at speeds up to Mach 8 and are very difficult to intercept—were not used in these attacks. Even then, some of its ballistic missiles reached high velocity and could penetrate what has been described as “the densest air defence in the world”.

Thus, these attacks demonstrated the emergence of a new strategic scenario in West Asia—that Israel no longer enjoys strategic superiority in the regional landscape. Iran’s President, Ebrahim Raisi, said that Iranian forces “turned a new page in the history of Iran’s authority and taught a lesson to the Zionist enemy”.

The remains of one of the ballistic missiles fired by Iran on April 13 and intercepted by Israel, lying on the shore of the Dead Sea. | Photo Credit: MENAHEM KAHANA/ AFP

Netanyahu clearly understood the calamitous implications of his attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Despite Biden’s advice to “take the win”, he knew there was no win: Israel had to make a quick counter-move to demonstrate its capacity to access important Iranian targets. As Israeli commentator Ben Caspit said, Netanyahu needed “to restore Israel’s deterrence capability”. It achieved this with the attack on Isfahan on April 19.

Though only three drones were directed at the city, the action had considerable symbolic value: Isfahan has Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility that is central to its weapons programme. It also has a prestigious nuclear technology research facility, and an airbase. Thus, Israel has made it clear that if Iran can hit targets in Israel, the latter also has the ability to attack Iran’s sensitive assets. Although  Ben-Gvir called the attack “feeble”, the message has gone across to Iran’s leaders that the two countries have the capacity for “mutual assured destruction”, and also of West Asia itself.

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What next?

Now that the threat of an Israel-Iran confrontation has receded, the attention has shifted back to the Gaza war. This means focussing on the terms of a truce and the release of hostages and prisoners. It is not yet clear whether this will be a short six-week truce or a longer ceasefire that will open up space to address festering political issues in Israel.

Netanyahu is unlikely to favour such a ceasefire since his unpopularity would lead to his overthrow, the revival of criminal cases against him, and his possible incarceration. Following Netanyahu’s ouster, a new government would emerge that would try to heal the traumatised nation, but it is unlikely to offer anything to the Palestinians. In fact, the US is likely to use all its clout to push for Saudi-Israeli normalisation of ties by highlighting the threat from Iran, and to rebuild the coalition against Iran made up of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

This would be an initiative that is well past its use-by date. Since 2020, at least, Saudi Arabia has shrugged off its security affiliation with the US and, by asserting strategic autonomy, built substantial ties with Iran as well as with Russia and China. This was quite obvious during the recent Israel-Iran stand-off when US attempts to shape a coalition with Arab states failed ignominiously.

A missile is on display with a Farsi sign on it saying “Death to Israel” in front of a mosque in the shape of Dome of the Rock of Jerusalem at the entrance to a town in Qods County, Iran, on April 21, 2024. | Photo Credit: Vahid Salemi/ AP

Iran now looks more formidable than it did before the Gaza war. The Islamic Republic and its allies have a substantial arsenal of drones and missiles of diverse capabilities which, taken together, can wreak havoc across West Asia. The distinguished commentator, Robin Wright, has pointed out that “Iran’s nuclear advances since 2019 have also narrowed the time until it could make a bomb if it should make the political decision to move forward on the world’s deadliest weapon”. Thus, the prospect of confrontations in the region evolving into an encounter involving nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.

Regional security at stake

The outlook for regional security remains uncertain. As noted above, there is now a degree of strategic parity between Israel and Iran, but neither the US nor Israel has a long-term strategy to address the challenges posed by Iran and its regional partners, beyond armed confrontation and periodic pinpricks that could flare up into larger military encounters.

Nor does Israel have any constructive response to the challenges posed by Palestinian aspirations, beyond abuse, incarceration, and periodic mass-murder. But it is possible that now Israel wields a much weaker hand: appalled by the carnage in Gaza, large sections of world opinion, including in the US, have become critical of Israel, and talk of a “two-state solution” has become widespread in several Western capitals, Biden included.

A day after the Iranian attack on Israel, the editorial board of TheNew York Times, traditionally the most pro-Israel media platform in the US, wrote that the “bond of trust” between Israeli and American leaders had been broken by “Mr Netanyahu and the hard-liners in his government,” and the US could not continue to supply arms to Israel until this bond was restored. It spoke of Netanyahu’s “cynical double games” and his turning “defiance of America’s leadership into a political tool”.

In this background, it is important to note that the Gaza war and the recent Israel-Iran military encounter have exposed Israel’s crucial dependence on the US for its security—through military supplies worth billions of dollars. Ken Klippenstein and Daniel Boguslaw have quoted American military sources in The Intercept as saying that “US and allied aircraft shot down the majority of [Iranian] drones and missiles”.

The new military and political realities ushered in by the Gaza war and the Israel-Iran military encounter should encourage new diplomatic approaches too, to address the festering issues in West Asia: one, the push for a two-state solution to meet Palestinian aspirations, and, two, renewed US-Iran dialogue on the nuclear agreement and wider regional security challenges.

Without these initiatives, the world could quite easily sleepwalk into a grave regional or even global conflict.

Talmiz Ahmad, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune. His latest book, West Asia at War: Repression, Resistance and Great Power Games, was published by HarperCollins in April 2022.